Legal claims defining the scope of protection. Each claim is shown in both the original legal language and a plain English translation.
1. A method for deleting data in a computing environment comprising: providing a computer system having at least a first document, a second document, a plurality of decryption keys, and a plurality of data segments stored therein, each of the plurality of data segments being decryptable by a selected one of the plurality of decryption keys, wherein the plurality of decryption keys comprises a first set of decryption keys, each being associated with the first document and not associated with the second document, a second set of decryption keys, each being associated with the second document and not associated with the first document; and a third set of decryption keys, each being associated with the first document and the second document; deleting the first document; and in response to the deleting of the first document, rendering the first set of decryption keys unusable and not rendering the second set of decryption keys and the third set of decryption keys unusable.
The method involves a computer system that manages data deletion by using different sets of decryption keys for multiple documents. The system has at least two documents. Data segments are stored, each requiring a specific decryption key to access. Some decryption keys are specific to the first document, some to the second, and some can decrypt data in both. When the first document is deleted, the decryption keys that *only* decrypt data in the first document become unusable. The decryption keys that decrypt data in the *second* document or *both* documents remain usable, allowing access to the data segments within those documents.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the computer system further has a plurality of data segments stored thereon, the plurality of data segments comprising a first set of data segments associated with the first document and the first set of decryption keys and not associated with the second document and the second set of decryption keys; a second set of data segments associated with the second document and the second set of decryption keys and not associated with the first document and the first set of decryption keys; and a third set of data segments associated with the first document, the first set of decryption keys, the second document, and the second set of decryption keys.
Building upon the previous data deletion method, the computer system stores data segments divided into three sets. The first set of data segments is associated with the first document and its unique decryption keys. The second set of data segments is associated with the second document and its unique decryption keys. The third set of data segments can be accessed by either the first or second document, utilizing decryption keys accessible by both. This setup ensures that each document has its own private data while also allowing shared data segments, all controlled by distinct key sets.
3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising in response to the deleting of the first document, rendering the first set of data segments unusable and not rendering the second set of data segments and the third set of data segments unusable.
Expanding on the data deletion process described previously where data segments are divided into three sets linked to document-specific and shared decryption keys, upon deleting the first document, only the data segments exclusively associated with the first document become unusable. The data segments associated with the second document and the data segments accessible by both documents remain usable. This prevents unnecessary data loss when deleting a single document in the system, ensuring data integrity for other existing documents.
4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the rendering of the first set of decryption keys unusable comprises overwriting the first set of decryption keys.
Further detailing the method for deleting data where decryption keys are rendered unusable, the process of rendering the decryption keys unusable, specifically the set associated only with the deleted first document, involves overwriting those decryption keys. Instead of simply deleting the keys, the system replaces them with random data or a null value, guaranteeing that the original decryption keys cannot be recovered and used to decrypt the associated data.
5. The method of claim 3 , wherein the rendering of the first set of decryption keys unusable comprises deleting the first set of decryption keys.
Further detailing the method for deleting data where decryption keys are rendered unusable, the process of rendering the decryption keys unusable, specifically the set associated only with the deleted first document, involves deleting the decryption keys. The system actively removes these keys from storage, ensuring that they are no longer available for decryption.
6. The method of claim 2 , wherein the first document and the second document each comprise a table of contents and the plurality of decryption keys are stored within the table of contents of at least one of the first document and the second document.
Expanding on the method of data deletion that uses key sets associated with data segments, the first and second documents each have a table of contents. The decryption keys are stored within the table of contents of at least one of these documents. This means that each document’s metadata, including the keys required to access its associated data segments, is located within its own organizational structure, simplifying key management and access control.
7. The method of claim 2 , wherein the first and second documents each comprise a table of contents, and each of the table of contents further refers to a logical-to-physical address map for each of the plurality of data segments that are associated with the respective documents, wherein the decryption key of each data segment is stored within the logical-to-physical address map.
Expanding on the method of data deletion that uses key sets associated with data segments, the first and second documents each have a table of contents that refers to a logical-to-physical address map for each of the data segments associated with the respective documents. The decryption key for each data segment is stored within this logical-to-physical address map. This allows a secure way to locate and decrypt each data segment.
8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising in response to the deleting of the first document, rendering the first set of data segments unusable and not rendering the second set of data segments and the third set of data segments unusable.
Building upon the method where documents contain tables of contents and decryption keys are stored in logical-to-physical address maps, after deleting the first document, the data segments solely linked to the first document become unusable, while segments linked to the second or both remain accessible.
9. The method of claim 8 , wherein rendering a data segment unusable comprises irretrievably destroying the associated decryption key in the logical-to-physical address map.
Expanding on the method where data segments are rendered unusable upon document deletion, and the decryption keys are stored within a logical-to-physical address map, rendering a data segment unusable involves permanently destroying the decryption key associated with that data segment within the logical-to-physical address map. This action ensures that the decryption key cannot be recovered, thus protecting the deleted data from unauthorized access.
Unknown
September 30, 2014
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