System and Method of Operating a Mutually Whitelisted Messaging Network

The present application is a Continuation in Parts (CIP) application of U.S. Complete application Ser. No. 18/783,017, filed on Jul. 24, 2024 entitled “System and method for managing tokenized Personally-Identifiable-Information”, which claims priority from U.S. Complete application Ser. No. 17/481,468, filed on Sep. 22, 2021 entitled “System and method for affixing a signature using biometric authentication”, which claims priority from US Complete application Ser. No. 17/018,273 filed on Sep. 11, 2020 entitled “System and method for sharing user preferences without having the user reveal their identity”, which claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/906,080 filed on Sep. 25, 2019 entitled “Method and system of managing personal and business information”, the U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/954,591 filed on Dec. 29, 2019 entitled “Method and system for anonymously matching consumers and businesses”, and also claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/029,717 filed on May 26, 2020 entitled “Method and system of storing identity and signature using the human body as a node.”

The present subject matter described herein, in general, relates to a system and a method of secure messaging and communication networks. More specifically, the present subject matter discloses the system and method of building a mutually whitelisted messaging network using biometric authentication to establish trusted connections between users while preventing unauthorized communications.

Since the early days of the internet era, emails have been an indispensable communication tool. However, when the email protocol was first designed, there was no consideration given to verifying the identities of the people sending and receiving email messages. Additionally, the protocol was focused on making it easier for people to be discoverable and reachable by members of the public. To this day, people have a common email address at which anyone can send them an email. Consequently, as the owner of an email address, you have no control over who has the ability to send you an email. As long as someone knows your email address, they can send you an email. You have no way of pre-emptively blocking the first unsolicited email from a recipient. Only after receiving the first unsolicited message, can you “mark the email as spam” and create a filter to file it away in the spam folder.

This fundamental design flaw in email systems has led to numerous problems that affect users daily. Spam has become ubiquitous because email addresses are easily shared without the owner's consent or knowledge. Even when users mark unsolicited emails as spam and request to be removed from mailing lists, there is no robust mechanism to enforce these unsubscribe requests, leading to continued unwanted communications.

Furthermore, the lack of authentication in traditional email systems means that the identities of senders and receivers are not verified, creating significant security vulnerabilities. This has given rise to phishing attacks, where malicious actors can easily pretend to be legitimate entities to fraudulently obtain sensitive information from unsuspecting users.

The stateless nature of email messages presents another significant issue. Email threads become continuous chains of appended objects, resulting in cluttered presentations full of redundant messages that are tedious to read and digest. Similarly, attachments are often included multiple times throughout email chains, causing unnecessary data traffic and visual clutter.

Current email systems also lack role-based access capabilities, preventing the assignment of participant roles such as author, editor, or viewer. They cannot trigger actions across the network directly, often requiring users to follow potentially malicious links to external systems. Moreover, email messages are not inherently connected to transaction networks, necessitating redirection to separate, often unverified applications.

The client-server architecture of email systems results in multiple recipients reading different copies of the same message rendered on their local machines. This prevents dynamic interaction between recipients, as responses are merely appended and copies sent to each recipient, exacerbating the poor signal-to-noise ratio.

Most problematically, current email protocols permit contact-sharing without consent. A person receives emails from everyone at the same address, and the protocol does not require a first person's consent for a second person to share the first person's email address with a third person. This is routinely exploited by entities sending unsolicited messages to unsuspecting users.

Additionally, traditional email systems lack rule-based permissioning. Users cannot set rules about who can message them, such as allowing only second-degree connections but not third. This prevents granular control over one's communication channels.

These numerous design flaws in traditional email systems highlight the need for a fundamentally different approach to digital communications. The present invention addresses these issues by creating a mutually whitelisted messaging network built on biometric authentication and cryptographic principles.

This summary introduces concepts related to a system and method of operating a mutually whitelisted messaging network. The concepts are further described in the detailed description. This summary is not intended to identify essential features of the claimed subject matter nor limit its scope.

In one implementation, a system for operating a mutually whitelisted messaging network is disclosed. The system comprises a processor and a memory coupled to the processor. The processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for receiving, by a registration module, a set of biometric samples from a User A via a System-App installed on User A's device. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for processing, by a key generation module, the set of biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKA1) for the User A. The Secret-Key (SKA1) is unique to the User A. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for generating, by an address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEA) for the User A by creating a unique email address on a System-Controlled-Domain and associating the unique email address with the Secret-Key (SKA1). The unique email address is treated as the Gated-Email-Address (GEA), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEA) is the User A's Public Key. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for receiving, by an invitation module, a first connection request from User A to connect with User B. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for generating, by the invitation module, a unique invitation and encoding the unique invitation to generate an encoded unique invitation. The encoded unique invitation is configured to be readable only by the System-App. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for transmitting, by a communication module, the encoded unique invitation to User B. The encoded unique invitation includes instructions for User B to download and install the System-App. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for detecting, by an onboarding module, when User B installs the System-App and captures User B's biometric samples. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for processing, by the key generation module, User B's biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKB1) for the User B, wherein the Secret-Key (SKB1) is unique to the User B. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for generating, by the address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEB) for User B by creating a unique address on the System-Controlled-Domain and associating the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) with the generated Secret-Key (SKB1), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) is User B's Public Key. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for receiving, by a connection module, data from the System-App on User B's device indicating that User B has received and decoded the encoded unique invitation. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for validating, by the connection module, the encoded unique invitation sent by User A to User B. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for generating, by a cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (ABSS) specific to User A's relationship with User B by applying a standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for generating, by the cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (BASS) specific to User B's relationship with User A by applying the standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for appending, by the connection module, a Record (RAB) to a Whitelist (WA) of User A, wherein the Record (RAB) reflects User A's permission to User B for sending messages to User A. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for appending, by the connection module, a Record (RBA) to a Whitelist (WB) of User B, wherein the Record (RBA) reflects User B's permission to User A for sending messages to User B. Further, the processor is configured to execute instructions stored in the memory for provisioning, by a messaging module, User A and User B to exchange messages based on Whitelist (WA) and Whitelist (WB).

In one implementation, a method for operating a mutually whitelisted messaging network is disclosed. The method comprises steps of receiving, by a registration module, a set of biometric samples from a User A via a System-App installed on User A's device. Further, the method comprises steps of processing, by a key generation module, the set of biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKA1) for the User A, wherein the Secret-Key (SKA1) is unique to the User A. Further, the method comprises steps of generating, by an address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEA) for the User A by creating a unique email address on a System-Controlled-Domain and associating the unique email address with the Secret-Key (SKA1), wherein the unique email address is treated as the Gated-Email-Address (GEA), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEA) is the User A's Public Key. Further, the method comprises steps of receiving, by an invitation module, a first connection request from User A to connect with User B. Further, the method comprises steps of generating, by the invitation module, a unique invitation and encoding the unique invitation to generate an encoded unique invitation, wherein the encoded unique invitation is configured to be readable only by the System-App. Further, the method comprises steps of transmitting, by a communication module, the encoded unique invitation to User B, wherein the encoded unique invitation includes instructions for User B to download and install the System-App. Further, the method comprises steps of detecting, by an onboarding module, when User B installs the System-App and captures User B's biometric samples. Further, the method comprises steps of processing, by the key generation module, User B's biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKB1) for the User B, wherein the Secret-Key (SKB1) is unique to the User B. Further, the method comprises steps of generating, by the address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEB) for User B by creating a unique address on the System-Controlled-Domain and associating the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) with the generated Secret-Key (SKB1), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) is User B's Public Key. Further, the method comprises steps of receiving, by a connection module, data from the System-App on User B's device indicating that User B has received and decoded the encoded unique invitation. Further, the method comprises steps of validating, by the connection module, the encoded unique invitation sent by User A to User B. Further, the method comprises steps of generating, by a cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (ABSS) specific to User A's relationship with User B by applying a standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the method comprises steps of generating, by the cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (BASS) specific to User B's relationship with User A by applying the standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the method comprises steps of appending, by the connection module, a Record (RAB) to a Whitelist (WA) of User A, wherein the Record (RAB) reflects User A's permission to User B for sending messages to User A. Further, the method comprises steps of appending, by the connection module, a Record (RBA) to a Whitelist (WB) of User B, wherein the Record (RBA) reflects User B's permission to User A for sending messages to User B. Further, the method comprises steps of provisioning, by a messaging module, User A and User B to exchange messages based on Whitelist (WA) and Whitelist (WB).

In one implementation, a computer program product for operating a mutually whitelisted messaging network is disclosed. The computer program product comprises a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therewith, wherein the program instructions are executable by a processor for receiving, by a registration module, a set of biometric samples from a User A via a System-App installed on User A's device. Further, the operations comprise steps of processing, by a key generation module, the set of biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKA1) for the User A, wherein the Secret-Key (SKA1) is unique to the User A. Further, the operations comprise steps of generating, by an address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEA) for the User A by creating a unique email address on a System-Controlled-Domain and associating the unique email address with the Secret-Key (SKA1), wherein the unique email address is treated as the Gated-Email-Address (GEA), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEA) is the User A's Public Key. Further, the operations comprise steps of receiving, by an invitation module, a first connection request from User A to connect with User B. Further, the operations comprise steps of generating, by the invitation module, a unique invitation and encoding the unique invitation to generate an encoded unique invitation, wherein the encoded unique invitation is configured to be readable only by the System-App. Further, the operations comprise steps of transmitting, by a communication module, the encoded unique invitation to User B, wherein the encoded unique invitation includes instructions for User B to download and install the System-App. Further, the operations comprise steps of detecting, by an onboarding module, when User B installs the System-App and captures User B's biometric samples. Further, the operations comprise steps of processing, by the key generation module, User B's biometric samples to generate a Secret-Key (SKB1) for the User B, wherein the Secret-Key (SKB1) is unique to the User B. Further, the operations comprise steps of generating, by the address generation module, a Gated-Email-Address (GEB) for User B by creating a unique address on the System-Controlled-Domain and associating the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) with the generated Secret-Key (SKB1), wherein the Gated-Email-Address (GEB) is User B's Public Key. Further, the operations comprise steps of receiving, by a connection module, data from the System-App on User B's device indicating that User B has received and decoded the encoded unique invitation. Further, the operations comprise steps of validating, by the connection module, the encoded unique invitation sent by User A to User B. Further, the operations comprise steps of generating, by a cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (ABSS) specific to User A's relationship with User B by applying a standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the operations comprise steps of generating, by the cryptographic module, a Shared Secret (BASS) specific to User B's relationship with User A by applying the standard cryptographic algorithm. Further, the operations comprise steps of appending, by the connection module, a Record (RAB) to a Whitelist (WA) of User A, wherein the Record (RAB) reflects User A's permission to User B for sending messages to User A. Further, the operations comprise steps of appending, by the connection module, a Record (RBA) to a Whitelist (WB) of User B, wherein the Record (RBA) reflects User B's permission to User A for sending messages to User B. Further, the operations comprise steps of provisioning, by a messaging module, User A and User B to exchange messages based on Whitelist (WA) and Whitelist (WB).

Reference throughout the specification to “various embodiments,” “some embodiments,” “one embodiment,” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Thus, appearances of the phrases “in various embodiments,” “in some embodiments,” “in one embodiment,” or “in an embodiment” in places throughout the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.

Referring to, implementationof Systemfor operating a mutually whitelisted messaging network is illustrated, in accordance with an embodiment of the present subject matter. In one embodiment, the Systemmay comprise a processor and a memory. Further, the Systemmay be connected to user devices through a network. It may be understood that the Systemmay be communicatively coupled with multiple users through one or more user devices-,-,-. . . ,-collectively referred to as user device. The Systemis configured to register users, authenticate users using biometric data, enable secure message exchange between mutually whitelisted users, and enforce permission-based messaging, all while preserving user privacy through the use of biometric-based cryptographic techniques.

In one embodiment, the networkmay be a cellular communication network used by user devicessuch as mobile phones, tablets, or other biometric-enabled devices. In one embodiment, the network may be the Internet. The user devicemay be any electronic device with biometric scanning capabilities, communication capabilities, and secure storage. The System-Controlled-Domainis a server component that hosts the unique email addresses generated for users. The Systemmay be configured to register users over the System. Further, the Systemmay be configured to authenticate the user each time the user makes a request to access the System, using biometric data and cryptographic techniques.

In one embodiment, the user devicesmay support communication over one or more types of networks in accordance with the described embodiments. For example, some user devices and networks may support communications over a Wide Area Network (WAN), the Internet, a telephone network (e.g., analog, digital, POTS, PSTN, ISDN, xDSL), a mobile telephone network (e.g., CDMA, GSM, NDAC, TDMA, E-TDMA, NAMPS, WCDMA, CDMA-2000, UMTS, 3G, 4G), a radio network, a television network, a cable network, an optical network (e.g., PON), a satellite network (e.g., VSAT), a packet-switched network, a circuit-switched network, a public network, a private network, and/or other wired or wireless communications network configured to carry data. The aforementioned user devicesand networkmay support wireless local area network (WLAN) and/or wireless metropolitan area network (WMAN) data communications functionality in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards, protocols, and variants such as IEEE 802.11 (“WiFi”), IEEE 802.16 (“WiMAX”), IEEE 802.20x (“Mobile-Fi”), and others.

In one embodiment, the user devicesare equipped with biometric scanning capabilities, such as facial recognition cameras, fingerprint scanners, or other biometric sensors. Furthermore, the user devicesare also enabled to securely store and process cryptographic keys. The user devicesare configured for storing Secret-Keys (SKA1/SKB1), Gated-Email-Addresses (GEA/GEB), and Whitelists (WA/WB) used in the authentication and messaging processes. The Systemmaintains a Database, which stores user records and their associated Gated-Email-Addresses as well as permission settings for contact sharing.

In one embodiment, the System-App installed on user devicesprovides the interface for users to register, connect with other users, manage their messaging permissions, and exchange secure messages. The Systemsupports all users equally, allowing them to register, authenticate, and exchange messages securely through their mutually established whitelists. The Systemis designed to maintain user privacy throughout the entire messaging process, allowing users to communicate only with explicitly approved contacts. Further, the Systemalso supports rule-based permissioning and stateful message objects. The process of user registration and the connection establishment processes are further illustrated with the block diagram in.

Referring now to, various components of the Systemare illustrated, in accordance with an embodiment of the present subject matter. As shown, the Systemmay include at least one processorand a memory. The memory consists of a set of modules. The set of modules may include a Registration Module, a Key Generation Module, an Address Generation Module, an Invitation Module, a Communication Module, an Onboarding Module, a Connection Module, a Cryptographic Module, a Messaging Module, a Permission Module, a Sharing Module, a Connection Request Module, a Notification Module, a Revocation Module, an Authentication Module, a Rule Configuration Module, a Rule Capture Module, a Rule Evaluation Module, a Message Creation Module, a Storage Module, a State Management Module, a Version Control Module, a Synchronization Module, a Presentation Module, a Security Enforcement Module, a Traffic Monitoring Module, an Email Analysis Module, and Other Module(s). In one embodiment, the at least one processoris configured to fetch and execute computer-readable instructions, stored in the Memory, corresponding to each module.

In one embodiment, the Memorymay include any computer-readable medium known in the art including, for example, volatile memory, such as static random-access memory (SRAM) and dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), and/or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable ROM, flash memories, hard disks, optical disks, and memory cards.

In one embodiment, the programmed instructions may include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc., which perform particular tasks, functions, or implement particular abstract data types. The Datamay comprise a Data Repository, and Other Data. The Other Data, amongst other things, serves as a repository for storing data processed, received, and generated by one or more components and programmed instructions. The Data Repositorymay include user records, Gated-Email-Addresses, Whitelists, permission settings, and other system data. The working of the Systemwill now be described in detail referring to.

In one embodiment, the Registration Moduleis responsible for registering each user in the mutually whitelisted messaging network. When a new user, for example User A, downloads and installs the System-App on their User Device, the Registration Moduleinitiates the registration process. The System-App prompts User A to provide biometric samples, which may include facial scans, fingerprints, voice samples, retina scans, or other biometric factors. For instance, User A might be asked to look into the device's camera for a facial scan or place their finger on the device's fingerprint sensor. These biometric samples form the foundation of the system's secure identity verification mechanism, as they cannot be easily stolen or replicated like traditional passwords.

In one embodiment, the Key Generation Moduleprocesses the biometric samples provided by User A to generate a Secret-Key (SKA1) that is unique to User A. This processing involves three main steps. First, the Key Generation Moduleextracts distinctive biometric features from the samples, such as facial geometry points, fingerprint minutiae, or voice pattern characteristics. Second, the extracted features are converted into a digital representation, typically a mathematical vector or matrix that captures the unique aspects of the user's biometrics. Finally, the Key Generation Moduleapplies a one-way transformation (such as a cryptographic hash function) to this digital representation to generate the Secret-Key (SKA1). This transformation ensures that even if someone obtains the Secret-Key (SKA1), they cannot reverse-engineer it to recreate the original biometric data, thereby protecting User A's biometric privacy. For example, if User A provides a face sample, the system might extract ridge patterns and minutiae points, convert these into a digital format, and then apply a transformation to produce a 256-bit Secret-Key that is uniquely tied to User A but does not contain the actual face image data.

In one embodiment, the Address Generation Moduleis responsible for creating a Gated-Email-Address (GEA) for User A. Unlike traditional email addresses that are accessible to anyone who knows them, a Gated-Email-Address functions as a Public Key in a public-private key cryptography system. The Address Generation Modulefirst creates a unique email address on a System-Controlled-Domain, for example, “userA.78f29@securedomain.com”. This address is then cryptographically associated with User A's Secret-Key (SKA1), creating a binding between the user's biometric identity and their messaging address. This association enables the Systemto verify message origins and ensure only authorized users can communicate. The Gated-Email-Address (GEA) represents User A's Public Key in the system, allowing other users to reference User A without accessing their private biometric information. For instance, if User B wants to connect with User A, they would use User A's Gated-Email-Address rather than any personal identifier.

The technical advantage of this approach is significant. Unlike traditional email addresses that anyone can send messages to once they know the address, the Gated-Email-Address requires explicit permission from the owner before messages can be received. This fundamentally changes the dynamics of digital communication, eliminating the possibility of unsolicited messages (spam) and enhancing user privacy and control.

In one embodiment, the Invitation Modulefacilitates the connection process between users. When User A wants to connect with User B, User A sends a connection request through the System-App. The Invitation Modulereceives this request and generates a unique invitation code specifically for this connection attempt. This invitation code contains encrypted information about User A and the connection request. The Invitation Modulethen encodes this invitation to ensure it can only be decoded and processed by the System-App. This encoding mechanism prevents third-party applications from intercepting or misusing the invitation. For example, the invitation might be encoded as a special URL or QR code that contains encrypted connection parameters only recognizable by the System-App.

In one embodiment, the Communication Modulehandles the transmission of the encoded unique invitation from User A to User B. This might occur through various channels such as email, SMS, or another messaging platform. Importantly, the invitation includes instructions for User B to download and install the System-App if they haven't already done so. For example, if User B receives the invitation via email, it might contain text like: “User A would like to connect with you securely. To accept this invitation, download the System-App from [app store link] and scan the enclosed QR code.” This approach ensures that all participants in the messaging network are using the same secure platform with consistent security measures.

In one embodiment, the Onboarding Moduledetects when User B installs the System-App and guides them through the initial setup process. When User B opens the System-App for the first time after installation, the module prompts them to provide their biometric samples. These samples might include facial scans, fingerprints, or other supported biometric factors. The Onboarding Modulecaptures these samples and passes them to the Key Generation Module, which follows the same process described earlier to generate User B's Secret-Key (SKB1). This ensures that each user in the Systemhas a unique biometric-derived key that serves as the foundation of their secure identity.

In one embodiment, the Connection Moduleis responsible for establishing the secure connection between users once the invitation process is complete. After User B installs the System-App and provides their biometric samples, the Connection Modulereceives data from User B's device indicating that they have received and decoded the unique invitation from User A. The Connection Modulethen validates this invitation to ensure it hasn't been tampered with and is still valid. This validation might include checking that the invitation hasn't expired, wasn't already used, and contains valid user information. Once validated, the Connection Moduleproceeds to establish the mutual whitelisting between User A and User B, which forms the basis of their ability to exchange messages.

In one embodiment, the Cryptographic Modulegenerates the secure cryptographic elements needed for the mutually whitelisted connection. For each connection between two users, the Cryptographic Modulegenerates two separate Shared Secrets using a standard cryptographic algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange or Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Specifically, Cryptographic Modulegenerates a Shared Secret (ABSS) for User A's relationship with User B and a separate Shared Secret (BASS) for User B's relationship with User A. These two distinct secrets ensure that each direction of communication has its own secure channel. For example, when User A sends a message to User B, it would be encrypted using the ABSS, and when User B responds, their message would be encrypted using the BASS. This approach provides perfect forward secrecy, ensuring that if one communication direction is compromised, the other remains secure.

In one embodiment, after the Shared Secrets are generated, the Connection Moduleupdates the respective user Whitelists. It appends a Record (RAB) to User A's Whitelist (WA), which explicitly indicates that User A has granted User B permission to send messages to them. Similarly, it appends a Record (RBA) to User B's Whitelist (WB), reflecting User B's permission for User A to send them messages. These whitelist records are crucial to the system's permission-based messaging model, as they clearly document which users have permission to communicate with each other. For instance, if User C attempts to send a message to User A but there is no corresponding record in User A's whitelist, the Systemwould automatically reject the message attempt.

In one embodiment, the Messaging Moduleenables the actual exchange of messages between connected users. Once User A and User B have established their mutual connection with corresponding whitelist entries, the Messaging Moduleprovisions them to exchange messages. This provisioning includes setting up the necessary channels, protocols, and encryption methods for secure communication. When User A sends a message to User B, the Messaging Modulefirst checks User B's Whitelist to confirm that User A has permission to message User B. If confirmed, the message is encrypted using the appropriate Shared Secret and delivered to User B. This whitelist verification happens for every message/email, ensuring continuous enforcement of user-defined communication permissions.

The technical advantage of this mutual whitelisting approach is that it creates a permission-based messaging network where communication can only occur with explicit consent from both parties. This eliminates spam, prevents phishing attempts, and gives users complete control over who can contact them. Furthermore, the use of biometric-derived keys ensures that the identities of all participants are authenticated, preventing impersonation and identity fraud.

In one embodiment, the Permission Moduleallows users to specify detailed settings for how their contact information can be shared with others. For example, User A can access profile settings in the System-App and define specific permission rules. The specific permission rules may include designating specific users who are authorized to share User A's Gated-Email-Address (GEA) with others (e.g., “Only User B and User C can share my contact”), defining categories of third-party users who may receive User A's contact information (e.g., “Only users from my company domain” or “Only users with verified professional accounts”) and specifying whether connection requests resulting from such sharing require automatic or manual approval (e.g., “Automatically approve connection requests from colleagues shared by my manager, but require manual approval for others”). These granular permissions give users unprecedented control over how their contact information spreads through the network.

In one embodiment, the Permission Modulestores these permission settings in association with User A's profile in a secure database. These settings are encrypted and can only be accessed through proper authentication within the System-App. This ensures that User A's preferences are consistently applied across all sharing attempts and cannot be circumvented.

In one embodiment, the Sharing Modulemanages the process when one user wants to share another user's contact information. For instance, if User B wants to share User A's contact with User C, User B would initiate a sharing request through the System-App. The Sharing Modulereceives this request and works with the Permission Moduleto retrieve User A's permission settings from the secure database. The Sharing Modulemay then compare the sharing request parameters against User A's permission settings to determine if the sharing is authorized. This comparison might involve checking if User B is on User A's list of authorized sharers, if User C fits into the categories User A has approved, and what type of approval is required. If the sharing request is authorized based on User A's preferences, the Sharing Moduletransmits User A's Gated-Email-Address (GEA) to User C. Additionally, the Sharing Modulerecords the complete details of this sharing transaction in an audit log, including the identities of all parties involved, the timestamp, and the outcome of the permission check. This audit trail provides transparency and accountability in how contact information propagates through the network.

In one embodiment, the Connection Request Modulehandles the process that occurs after a user's contact has been shared. Continuing the example, after User C receives User A's Gated-Email-Address (GEA), they might want to establish a direct connection. User C would then send a connection request to User A through the System-App. This request includes User C's own Gated-Email-Address (GEC) and a reference to User B as the source of the contact. The Connection Request Modulereceives this request and initiates the verification process through the Permission Module.

In one embodiment, the Permission Moduleverifies whether User C meets the criteria specified in User A's permission settings through a multi-step process. For example, the Permission Modulemay check the relationship between User B (the sharer) and User C (the recipient) to confirm they have a valid connection, evaluate any category-based rules that apply to User C, such as organizational affiliation or user attributes, and determine whether User A's settings allow for automatic approval of this particular connection request or require manual intervention. This comprehensive verification ensures that User A's preferences are respected throughout the network expansion process.

In one embodiment, the Notification Modulemanages communication about connection requests and other system events. If the Permission Moduledetermines that automatic approval is not authorized for User C's connection request to User A, the Notification Modulesends a connection request notification to User A's System-App. This notification includes User C's identity information and explicitly shows the connection path through User B, providing User A with context about how this new contact relates to their existing network. For example, the notification might read: “User C (from Organization XYZ) would like to connect with you. They received your contact from User B (your connection since [date]).” This transparency helps User A make informed decisions about expanding their network.

In one embodiment, upon User A's approval of the connection request, the Cryptographic Modulegenerates the necessary secure elements for this new connection. Specifically, it creates a Shared Secret (ACSS) for User A's relationship with User C and a Shared Secret (CASS) for User C's relationship with User A, using the same standard cryptographic algorithm employed for other connections. Following this, the Connection Moduleappends the appropriate records to each user's whitelist. For example, a record to User A's Whitelist (WA) reflecting permission for User C to message User A and a record to User C's Whitelist (WC) reflecting permission for User A to message User C may be added. Finally, the Messaging Moduleprovisions User A and User C to exchange messages based on these updated whitelists.

The technical advantage of this consent-based contact sharing mechanism is that it preserves user privacy and control while still enabling network growth. Unlike traditional email or messaging platforms where contact information can be shared without the owner's knowledge or consent, this system ensures that users maintain complete control over who receives their contact information and who can subsequently connect with them. This prevents unwanted contact proliferation while still allowing for the organic growth of professional and personal networks.

In one embodiment, the Revocation Modulehandles the process when a user decides to revoke another user's permission to send them messages. For example, if User A decides they no longer wish to receive messages from User B, they can initiate a revocation request through the System-App. This might happen if User B is sending unwanted content, if the professional relationship has ended, or for any other reason User A chooses. The Revocation Modulereceives this request and works with the Authentication Moduleto validate that the request is genuinely from User A by performing biometric authentication. This verification step prevents unauthorized revocation attempts and ensures that only the account owner can modify their connection permissions.

In one embodiment, once the revocation request is validated, the Connection Moduleremoves the Record (RAB) from User A's Whitelist (WA). This record removal effectively withdraws User A's permission for User B to send messages to User A. Simultaneously, the Cryptographic Moduleexpires the Shared Secret (ABSS) specific to User A's relationship with User B and the Shared Secret (BASS) specific to User B's relationship with User A. This expiration renders the cryptographic keys invalid, preventing any further encrypted communication between the two users. The Messaging Modulethen updates the messaging permissions to disallow message transmission between User A and User B. Finally, the Notification Modulesends a notification to User B informing them that their messaging permission has been revoked by User A. This notification does not require User B's acknowledgment or approval, as the revocation process is unilateral reflecting User A's right to control who can communicate with them.

The technical advantage of this revocation mechanism is that it gives users complete control over their communications at all times. Unlike traditional email where blocking a sender might not be completely effective or where the sender might not be notified of the block, the Systemprovides a definitive and technologically enforced revocation process. Once revoked, it becomes cryptographically impossible for the blocked user to send messages, creating a truly secure and user-controlled communication environment.

In one embodiment, the Rule Configuration Moduleprovides users with powerful options to define granular messaging permission rules. For example, User A can access the rule configuration interface in the System-App and set up specific rules determining which categories of users can send messaging requests to them. These rule options include connection-based rules, such as allowing only first and second-degree connections or extending to include third-degree connections, organizational affiliation rules, such as allowing messages from anyone within their company or specific partner organizations, temporal rules based on connection duration, such as only allowing messages from connections established for more than 30 days, and attribute-based rules, such as allowing messages only from users with verified professional credentials or specific role designations.

In one embodiment, the Rule Capture Modulecaptures these granular messaging permission rules as specified by users through the System-App interface. The Rule Capture Moduleensures that the rules are properly formatted, logically consistent, and can be effectively implemented by the system. For example, if User A creates contradictory rules, the Rule Capture Modulewould flag the inconsistency and prompt for clarification. Once captured, the Permission Modulestores these rules in association with User A's profile on the System-App.

In one embodiment, the Rule Evaluation Moduleprocesses incoming messaging permission requests by applying the stored rules. When a user attempts to send a message or connection request to User A, the Rule Evaluation Modulefirst extracts relevant attributes of the requesting user, such as their connection degree, organizational affiliation, connection duration, and any other attributes specified in User A's rules. It then retrieves User A's granular messaging permission rules and systematically evaluates the requesting user's attributes against each rule. Through this evaluation, the module determines whether the request satisfies User A's permission criteria. Based on this determination, the Rule Evaluation Moduleautomatically approves or rejects the incoming request, or flags it for manual review when User A's rules specify that manual approval is required for certain categories of requests.